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Abstract
We propose a method to set identify bounds on the sharing rule for a general
collective household consumption model. Unlike the e¤ects of distribution fac-
tors, the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identied without strong as-
sumptions on preferences across households. Our new results show that, though
not point identied without these assumptions, strong bounds on the sharing
rule can be obtained. We get these bounds by applying revealed preference re-
strictions implied by the collective model to the households continuous aggregate
demand functions. We obtain informative bounds even if nothing is known about
whether each good is public, private, or assignable within the household, though
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having such information tightens the bounds. We apply our method to US PSID
data, obtaining narrow bounds that yield useful conclusions regarding the e¤ects
of income and wages on intrahousehold resource sharing, and on the prevalence
of individual (as opposed to household level) poverty.
JEL Classication: D11, D12, D13, C14, C30.
Keywords: collective model, consumer demand, revealed preferences, sharing
rule, identication, bounds.
1 Introduction
The collective model has become increasingly popular for analyzing household con-
sumption behavior. Becker (1973, 1981) rst considered collective household models,
in which the household is characterized as a collection of individuals, each with well
dened objective functions that interact to generate household level decisions. In a
consumption setting, the model assumes that expenditures on each good and service
the household buys are the outcome of multi-person decision making, in which each
individual household member is characterized by his or her own rational preferences.
Following Chiappori (1988, 1992), rationalgroup consumption is dened as any Pareto
e¢ cient outcome of a within-group bargaining process. This collective approach con-
trasts with the conventional unitary approach, which models households as if they were
single decision makers.1
An intrinsic feature of the collective model is the so-called sharing rule, which
governs the within-household distribution of resources. This sharing rule is often inter-
preted as an indicator of the relative bargaining power of individual household mem-
bers. Unlike other measures of power such as Pareto weights, an attractive feature of
the resource sharing rule is that it is expressed in monetary terms. The sharing rule
is also useful for recovering information about the economic well being of household
members. For example, Lise and Seitz (2011) use sharing rule estimates to recover
the population distribution of income across individuals rather than across households;
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) combine the sharing rule with other informa-
tion to recover indi¤erence scalesthat measure the welfare implications of changes
in household composition; and Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2013) use sharing rule
estimates to back out rates of child poverty. See also Browning, Bourguignon, Chiap-
pori and Lechene (1994), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), Blundell, Chiappori
and Meghir (2005), Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), Couprie, Peluso and Trannoy (2010),
Bargain and Donni (2012) and Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012a) for various
applications of the collective consumption model that make use of the sharing rule
concept.
In empirical analyses, the sharing rule is generally not observed. Typically, the
1Chiappori (1988) only assumes Pareto e¢ ciency of the intra-household allocation of resources. In
this sense, he generalized the work of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) who
focused on the empirical implications of specic bargaining rules such as Nash bargaining.
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only information available is total household expenditures on each good or service
the household buys, along with general household characteristics, like demographic
composition, information on wages, income, holdings of durables, and wealth measures.
Even when detailed intrahousehold consumption data are available, the sharing rule can
still be hard to measure because of shared consumption, public goods, and externalities
within the household.
Information regarding the sharing rule is often obtained by making use of distrib-
ution factors, in the terminology of Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene
(1994) or Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) (these also roughly correspond
to what McElroy (1990) calls extra-environmental parameters). Distribution factors are
observed household or neighborhood characteristics that a¤ect Pareto weights within a
households optimization model but not the preferences of individual household mem-
bers or the household budget set. A well known result in the literature is that changes in
the sharing rule, resulting from changes in distribution factors, can be identied given
household level demand functions. However, the level of the sharing rule is not itself
identied. See, for example, Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) for a general statement and
proof of this result.2
This nonidentication is unfortunate, because many of the uses of sharing rule es-
timates, such as calculation of poverty lines, indi¤erence scales, and distributions of
income and welfare, depend on the level of the sharing rule. A few di¤erent responses
to this nonidentication result have been proposed. The commonest response is to
ignore the problem, and only report estimates of the impact of distribution factors
on the sharing rule (see, e.g., Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene, 1994,
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002, or Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir, 2005). A
second approach is to try to collect more information on the consumption of individual
household members (see, e.g., Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2012a, and Menon,
Pendakur, and Perali, 2012). This method is inherently limited by the di¢ culty of
measuring the fraction of shared goods that are consumed by each individual, and
cannot deal with potential externalities within a household. A third response is to
make additional identifying assumptions. These assumptions hypothesize that some
features of individualspreferences remain the same across households of di¤erent com-
positions (rst proposed in Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2013; see also Lewbel
and Pendakur, 2008, and Bargain and Donni, 2012).
In this paper, we follow a completely di¤erent approach. We return to the stan-
dard Chiappori framework, where all that can be observed is household level demand
2An additional obstacle to the use of distribution factors for identication is that distribution factors
are required to only a¤ect allocations but not tastes. This feature of not a¤ecting tastes can be di¢ cult
to verify. For example, relative ages of the members could a¤ect bargaining power, but age is also
likely to a¤ect memberstastes for goods, and would therefore not be valid as a distribution factor.
Another example is that some studies use relative wages as distribution factors. In our analysis wages
(while appearing in our model) are not distribution factors, because in addition to possibly a¤ecting
allocations, they also a¤ect the consumption of leisure. Wages can only be distribution factors in
models that assume separability of leisure from consumption.
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functions, and no additional assumptions are made. We combine this standard frame-
work with a revealed preference approach in the tradition of Samuelson (1938) and
Houthakker (1950). We show that, although the sharing rule cannot be point identi-
ed, the households demand functions do provide information regarding sharing, and
that information can be used to calculate highly informative bounds on the sharing
rule. In short, we show that the sharing rule can be usefully set identied. Moreover,
in contrast to the rest of the literature, this set identication does not require distrib-
ution factors, the availability of detailed intrahousehold allocation data, or additional
identifying assumptions on behavior across households of varying composition.
We provide a practical method for calculating upper and lower bounds on the
resource shares of each individual in a household, consistent with the collective con-
sumption model. The method allows for the presence of both public and private goods
within the household, and does not require the public or private nature of any good
to be specied a priori. However, if a subset of goods is known to be private, then we
can use this information to tighten the bounds. Similarly, the method allows goods to
have externalities within the household, so one members consumption of a good can
a¤ect the utility of other members.
Our method begins by estimating the observable demand functions of households.
These estimates can embody restrictions that are implied by rational collective house-
hold behavior, such as the absence of money illusion and the SR1 condition discussed
below. Sharing rule bounds are then obtained by combining the information given by
a households demand function with inequality restrictions implied by revealed prefer-
ence theory as applied to individual household members. Typically revealed preference
restrictions are applied to a nite number of observed demand bundles, but we apply
them to the entire demand function. Much of what makes our bounds usefully narrow
is both that they make use of entire demand functions, and those demand functions
themselves incorporate useful information on household characteristics and theoretical
restrictions like the SR1 condition for collective household behavior.
Other papers that combine estimated demand responses with revealed preference
restrictions are Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008), though both the goals
and methodology of their papers di¤er from ours. They assume a unitary rather than
collective model of consumption behavior, so their model does not contain a sharing
rule and cannot be used to analyze intrahousehold allocation issues. Their goal is
to obtain bounds on demand functions that are consistent with the unitary model,
when faced with a limited number of price regimes. They apply revealed preference
restrictions to estimated Engel curves, rather than to demand curves. They estimate
demands as functions of total expenditures separately in each of a limited number of
(observed) price regimes, and they impose revealed preference restrictions (assuming
the household behaves as a single utility maximizing consumer) to bound demand
functions. In contrast, we estimate household demands as functions of both total
expenditures and prices, and then impose revealed preference restrictions at the level
of individual household members to obtain bounds on the sharing rule in a non-unitary
setting. What the two approaches have in common is that they both use estimated
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demand functions instead of observed data points to tighten bounds associated with
revealed preference restrictions.
While not actually identifying the sharing rule, many papers propose tests (or
checks) of whether household demands are consistent with the Chiappori model of ra-
tional, Pareto e¢ cient group consumption. Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide a
di¤erential characterization of the general collective consumption model.3 They nd
that household behavior is consistent with Pareto e¢ cient group consumption only if
there exists a household pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can be decomposed as the sum of
a symmetric negative semi-denite matrix and a matrix of rank 1 (in the case of two
household members, i.e. the so-called SR1 condition). Chiappori and Ekeland (2006)
show that this condition, together with homogeneity and adding up, is also (locally)
su¢ cient for the existence of individual utility functions and Pareto weights that repro-
duce the observed household behavior. Following in the Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973)
and Varian (1982) tradition, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2010, 2011)
work with discrete sets of price and quantity bundles reecting householdsexpendi-
ture choices. They derive revealed preference characterizations of several versions of
the collective model, including the general version that we consider here. In particular,
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011) show how some information regarding the
sharing rule can be recovered using this pure revealed preference characterization, but
only with discrete sets of price and quantity bundles, and under the assumption that
the public or private nature of the goods is known. In contrast, the present paper
exploits the greater information that is available in continuous demand functions for a
general collective model.
To illustrate the practical usefulness of our method, we apply it to a sample of
American households drawn from the 1999-2009 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). We nd that our methodology yields quite narrow bounds. For example, we
obtain less than a 5 percentage point di¤erence between the upper and lower bounds
on individual resource shares for more than 75% of the childless couples in our sam-
ple. We apply these results to draw a variety of meaningful and robust conclusions
regarding the e¤ects of household income and relative wages on intrahousehold resource
shares, and on the prevalence of individual poverty. For example, 11% of our child-
less couples have incomes below a two-person poverty line, but taking the individual
allocations of resources within households into account, our bounds show that 15% to
18% of individuals are below the corresponding poverty line for individuals. Moreover,
it turns out that poverty is more prevalent among women in childless couples than
among men in childless couples. We obtain qualitatively similar results for couples
with children. This shows that our bounds are tight enough to reveal a substantial
impact of intrahousehold resource share allocations on poverty measures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general col-
3The term di¤erentialrefers to the fact that the characterization is obtained by di¤erentiating
the functional specications of the fundamentals of the model (e.g. the utility functions or demands
of the household members) as in the calculation of Slutsky matrices.
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lective consumption model and the corresponding sharing rule representation. Section
3 discusses revealed preference restrictions. Section 4 considers sharing rule identica-
tion. We also introduce extensions yielding tighter bounds in settings where the private
consumption of some goods is assignable to individual household members. Section 5
presents our empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The collective model and the sharing rule
This section formally presents the collective household model, and introduces the shar-
ing rule representation that will be used in the following sections.
2.1 A general collective model
We consider a household with two individuals (1 and 2) who consume a set of goods
N = f1; :::; jN jg. We focus on two member households only for notational convenience.
All results can be generalized towards households with any nite number of members.
Let q = g (p; y) denote a household demand function that denes a quantity bundle
q 2RjN j+ as a function of prices p 2RjN j++ and income y2R++.4
We focus on the most general version of the collective model discussed by Browning
and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006, 2009). This model allows
every good to have both private and publicly consumed components, so
q = q1 + q2 + qH with qc2RjN j+ (c = 1; 2; H);
with q1 and q2 the privately consumed quantities of individuals 1 and 2; and qH the
publicly consumed quantities. For example, if the rst good in bundle q is gasoline,
the rst elements of q1 and q2 would be the quantities used by household members
1 and 2, respectively, while driving alone, and the rst element of qH would be the
quantity gasoline they used while riding in their car together.
Next, dene general (strongly concave and di¤erentiable) utility functions U1 and
U2 for the members, so
U1
 
q1;q2;qH

and U2
 
q1;q2;qH

:
These utility functions allow for (positive) externalities associated with the privately
consumed goods, e.g., q2 appears in U1 because member 1 can derive utility from
having member 2 consume q2, and vice versa.5 Finally, the model assumes a Pareto
4We refer to y as income for short, but more precisely y is the total amount of household resources
that are devoted to purchasing goods and services in a given time period. This may di¤er from actual
income due to saving or borrowing, or from implicitly buying ows of consumption from durables,
and may include foregone labor income if leisure is included among consumed goods and services.
5Beckerian caring preferences are a special case of the general preferences we consider here. Specif-
ically, caring preferences correspond to the model Um
 
q1;q2;qH

= Fm(V 1(q1;qH);V 2(q2;qH)),
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e¢ cient intrahousehold allocation, i.e. there exists a Pareto weight  (p; y)2R++ such
that q = q1 + q2 + qH = g (p; y) for
(q1;q2;qH) = arg max
x1;x2;xH
[U1
 
x1;x2;xH

+  (p; y)U2
 
x1;x2;xH

s.t. (1)
p0
 
x1 + x2 + xH
  y; xc2RjN j+ (c = 1; 2; H)]:
The Pareto weight function  represents the bargaining powerof member 2 relative
to member 1, in the sense that the larger the weight, the greater is the extent to
which household resources are allocated based on member 2s preferences. The Pareto
weight can vary with prices, household income and (like member utility functions)
could also depend on other exogenous variables such as demographic characteristics of
the household members. Although not necessary for our identication theorems, in our
later empirical application we assume that the household does not su¤er from money
illusion, which implies that  (p; y) is homogeneous of degree zero in p; y.
As noted in the introduction, some identication results are achieved in the col-
lective household model literature by assuming the existence of distribution factors,
that is, additional exogenous variables that a¤ect Pareto weights but do not a¤ect the
membersutility functions or the budget set. Our model permits but does not require
or assume the existence of distribution factors.
2.2 Sharing rule representation
We now describe a sharing rule representation of household demand behavior that is
consistent with the model introduced above.6 Intuitively, this representation provides
a decentralized interpretation of the households optimization problem as dened in
(1). Specically, it represents Pareto e¢ cient household behavior as equivalent to the
outcome of a two-step allocation procedure. In the rst step, the so-called sharing
rule distributes the aggregate household income y across the group members, dening
individual income shares y1 and y2 such that y = y1+ y2. In the second step, each
individual maximizes her/his own utility function subject to her/his own income share
and evaluated at her/his own Lindahl prices associated with privately and publicly
consumed quantities. The Lindahl prices represent each individuals marginal willing-
ness to pay for the di¤erent quantities. We are not assuming that households literally
allocate resources using this procedure. Rather, the sharing rule representation simply
states that the outcome of the households allocation process dened in (1) is mathe-
matically equivalent to this two step allocation procedure.
where Fm is an increasing function and V i are standard utility functions. See also Chiappori (1988,
1992) for a more detailed discussion.
6See Chiappori (1988, 1992) for a detailed discussion on the equivalence between the characteriza-
tions of Pareto e¢ cient consumption behavior in (1) and (2). Chiappori concentrated on a simplied
setting with privately consumed quantities without externalities. However, extending his argument to
our setting is relatively straightforward.
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To formalize the sharing rule representation, for each individual m (m = 1; 2)
consider an individual demand function gm that denes a quantity bundle eqm2RjN j+ as
a function of individual prices pm;12RjN j+ ; pm;22RjN j+ ; pm;H2RjN j+ and individual income
ym2R++. Specically let eqm = gm(pm;1; pm;2; pm;H ; ym) where eqm = eqm;1+eqm;2+eqm;H
with
(eqm;1; eqm;2; eqm;H) = arg max
x1;x2;xH
[Um
 
x1;x2;xH

s.t. (2) 
pm;1
0
x1 +
 
pm;2
0
x2 +
 
pm;H
0
xH  ym;xc2RjN j+ (c = 1; 2; H)].
Consider q1, q2 and qH (with q = q1+q2+qH) that solve (1). The same quantities
solve (2) (and thus q = eqm) if
pm;c = Umqc=
m, (3)
where Umqc is the gradient of the function U
m dened at qc (c = 1; 2; H), 1 is the
optimizing value of the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint in (1), and 2 =
1=. By this construction, each vector pm;c2RjN j+ represents individual ms marginal
willingness to pay for qc.
Pareto e¢ ciency implies p1;c+p2;c = p (c = 1; 2; H) by construction, so pm;c equals
the Lindahl price vector for individual m associated with qc. Thus, under these prices
the maximization program (2) corresponds to the second step of the two-step proce-
dure described above (given y1 and y2 dened in the rst step). Slightly abusing our
notation, the sharing rule can be dened as the construction of y1 and y2 that solves
 
y1; y2

= argmaxey1;ey2

U1
 
g1
 
p1;1;p1;2;p1;H ; ey1+  (p; y)U2  g2  p2;1;p2;2;p2;H ; ey2
s.t. ey1 + ey2  y

:
(4)
As noted in the introduction, the sharing rule is often used in place of the Pareto
weight as a bargaining power measure, where the higher the relative income share ym=y
of memberm is, the greater is his/her bargaining power in the household.7 The sharing
rule concept is often a more useful measure than the Pareto weight  in empirical
applications, because it is independent of cardinal representations of preferences. In
addition, since y1 and y2 are measured in the same units as income y, they can be
interpreted as measures of the wealth or poverty of individual household members.
3 Revealed preferences
Typical household data sets provide enough information to empirically estimate the
household demand function g (p; y), but not the individual demand functions gm or
income shares ym (m = 1; 2). Our primary goal is then to recover information regarding
7See, for example, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) for a detailed discussion on the relation
between relative income shares ym=y in (2) and the bargaining Pareto weight  in (1).
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the sharing rule that denes the individual incomes y1 and y2 given g (p; y). In this
section we provide a revealed preference characterization of the collective consumption
model. The inequalities obtained by this characterization will then be used to identify
our bounds on the sharing rule.
3.1 Basic concepts
In this subsection we dene some standard concepts in the revealed preference litera-
ture, as applied to an individuals demand function gm. For given pm;1;pm;2;pm;H and
ym, dene the budget set
B
 
pm;1;pm;2;pm;H ; ym

= fx 2RjN j+ jx = x1 + x2 + xH ; 
pm;1
0
x1 +
 
pm;2
0
x2 +
 
pm;H
0
xH  ymg:
We now dene the concept of the revealed preference relation associated with the
demand function gm, denoted by Rg
m
o .
Denition 1 (direct revealed preference) Let gm be an individual demand func-
tion. The direct revealed preference relation associated with gm is dened by:
for all x, z 2RjN j+ : xRgmo z if there exist pm;c2RjN j+ (c = 1; 2; H) and ym2R++ such
that x = gm
 
pm;1;pm;2;pm;H ; ym

and z 2B(pm;1; pm;2; pm;H ; ym) with x6=z.
In words, quantity bundle x is revealed preferred to another bundle z if z belonged to
the budget set B(pm;1; pm;2; pm;H ; ym) under which x was chosen by equaling gm(pm;1;
pm;2; pm;H ; ym). Here xRg
m
o z because the individual could have a¤orded to choose z but
did not do so, choosing x instead. The revealed preference concept in Denition 1 di¤ers
from the standard one only in that, for our collective setting, revealed preferences are
dened at the level of an individual household member m, while in a standard unitary
context they are dened at the level of the aggregate household. Correspondingly, we
consider preferences that pertain to decomposed quantity bundles, which are evaluated
at individual prices pm;1, pm;2 and pm;H for individual m. The associated quantity
decomposition appears from the denition of the budget set B
 
pm;1;pm;2;pm;H ; ym

.
We can now dene the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP; after Samuel-
son, 1938) for an individual m.
Denition 2 (WARP) Let gm be an individual demand function. This function gm
satises WARP if the relation Rg
m
o is asymmetric.
Our sharing rule identication method will exploit the empirical implications of
WARP in the context of the collective household consumption model.
As shown by Houthakker (1950), utility maximization generally implies that the
Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) holds. SARP extends WARP by also
exploiting transitivity of preferences. We could readily reformulate Proposition 2 be-
low, showing how to include SARP restrictions in our identication bounds in theory.
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However, we only exploit WARP and not SARP in our application because it would
be much more di¢ cult if not completely intractable to fully operationalize transitivity
when empirically implementing our identication procedure. It might be possible in
practice to incorporate some but not all of the additional restrictions implied by SARP,
by only considering the transitivity conditions implied by revealed preference sequences
of a given xed maximum length. See, for example, Echenique, Lee and Shum (2011),
who apply a xed length SARP procedure, albeit in a simpler context than ours. In
their application, they found that considering SARP with sequences of xed maximum
length instead of WARP did not substantively a¤ect their empirical results. Also, the
loss of information in only considering WARP rather than SARP will be zero under
conditions described by Uzawa (1960) and Bossert (1993).
3.2 Characterizing the collective model
We have described revealed preference relations in terms of individual demand func-
tions gm, which are not observed. We now dene the concept of admissibleindividual
demand functions. Roughly, this concept captures all possible specications of the
(unknown) individual demand functions that are consistent with the (known) house-
hold demand function. We will then apply revealed preference relations to admissible
demand functions to obtain sharing rule bounds.
Denition 3 (admissible individual demands) For a given household demand func-
tion g, the pair of individual demand functions g1 and g2 are admissible if, for all p
and y,
g (p; y) = g1
 
p1;1;p1;2;p1;H ; y1

= g2
 
p2;1;p2;2;p2;H ; y2

,
for some pm;c (m = 1; 2; c = 1; 2; H) and ym such that
y1 + y2 = y and p1;c + p2;c = p, with ym 2 R++ and pm;c 2 RjN j+ :
Let Q (g) represent the collection of all admissible individual demands g1 and g2,
i.e.,
Q (g) = f g1;g2 j g1 and g2 are admissible for the household demand function gg:
We can now dene the condition for a collective rationalization that we will use
for identication. Basically, this condition states that for the given household demand
function g, there must exist at least one specication of admissible individual demand
functions that solves (2).
Denition 4 (collective rationalization) Let g be a household demand function.
A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a collective rationalization of g if there
exist admissible individual demand functions (g1;g2) 2 Q (g) such that, for each m,
gm
 
pm;1;pm;2;pm;H ; ym

= q1 + q2 + qH
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for
(q1;q2;qH) = arg max
x1;x2;xH
[Um
 
x1;x2;xH

s.t. 
pm;1
0
x1 +
 
pm;2
0
x2 +
 
pm;H
0
xH  ym].
We have the following result, which establishes a revealed preference characteriza-
tion of the collective consumption model under consideration. (The appendix contains
the proofs of our main results.)
Proposition 1 Consider a household demand function g. There exists a pair of utility
functions U1 and U2 that provides a collective rationalization of g only if there exist
admissible individual demand functions (g1;g2) 2 Q (g) that both satisfy WARP.
In theory, we can construct bounds by enumerating every element of Q (g) and
evaluating every possible sharing rule consistent with each of these elements. However,
such an enumeration is not tractable, so the aim now is to construct a computationally
feasible procedure for obtaining these bounds.
4 Sharing rule identication
Consider a household demand function g. Suppose that we evaluate a situation E
that is characterized by prices pE and household income yE. The households demand
in this particular situation is observed and equals g (pE; yE). The (set) identication
question asks for bounds on the individual incomes (y1E and y
2
E) that are consistent
with a collective rationalization of the observed household demand g. Our procedure
will start from the characterization given in Proposition 1. Essentially, we dene lower
bounds yl1E and y
l2
E and upper bounds y
u1
E and y
u2
E so that
yl1E < y
1
E < y
u1
E and y
l2
E < y
2
E < y
u2
E . (5)
By construction, these bounds will simultaneously apply to all possible specications
of admissible individual demand functions.
4.1 Identication in theory
To sketch the basic idea of our approach, suppose for now that the individual demand
functions g1 and g2 were known (in addition to knowing the household demand function
g). Then we would also know the individual prices pm;c (m = 1; 2; c = 1; 2; H) and
income ym that imply g (p; y) = gm(pm;1; pm;2; pm;H ; ym) for each p and y. See
Denition 3. So if the demand functions g1 and g2 were known, then the income
shares would be known.
Although in practice we do not know the true g1 and g2, what we do know is that
they must be admissible. Let qE = g (pE; yE) = gm(p
m;1
E ; p
m;2
E ; p
m;H
E ; y
m
E ). A necessary
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condition for a given pair of functions g1 and g2 to be admissible, and hence consistent
with a collective rationalization of g is
y1E  inf
x11;x
2
1;x
H
1
[
 
p1;1E
0
x11+
 
p1;2E
0
x21 +

p1;HE
0
xH1 jx1Rg
1
o qE] and
y2E  inf
x12;x
2
2;x
H
2
[
 
p2;1E
0
x12+
 
p2;2E
0
x22 +

p2;HE
0
xH2 jx2Rg
2
o qE]: (6)
This necessary condition for a collective rationalization of g follows immediately from
the WARP conditions in Proposition 1. The right hand sides of the inequalities in (6)
dene upper bounds yu1E and y
u2
E for the income shares y
1
E and y
2
E, i.e. y
1
E < y
u1
E and
y2E < y
u2
E . Lower bounds then follow from y
l1
E = yE   yu2E and yl2E = yE   yu1E .
Since we do not know the functions g1 and g2, we obtain bounds by considering all
possible admissible individual demands (g1;g2) 2 Q (g). The tightest bounds will be
obtained if the (positive) di¤erences yu1E   yl1E and yu2E   yl2E are as small as possible.
Substituting yE   yu2E for yl1E in yu1E   yl1E (or substituting yE   yu1E for yl2E in yu2E   yl2E )
obtains that these tightest bounds correspond to the smallest value of yu1E + y
u2
E   yE.
Since yE is a constant, we will aim at minimizing the sum yu1E + y
u2
E in what follows.
(In this respect, also observe that minimizing (yu1E + y
u2
E ) is equivalent to maximizing
(yl1E + y
l2
E ):)
Summarizing, the upper bounds yu1E and y
u2
E are required to solve
sup
(g1;g2)2Q(g)
inf
x11;x
2
1;x
H
1
x12;x
2
2;x
H
2
(yu1E + y
u2
E ) (P.0)
s.t.
yu1E =
 
p1;1E
0
x11+
 
p1;2E
0
x21 +

p1;HE
0
xH1 ,
yu2E =
 
p2;1E
0
x12+
 
p2;2E
0
x22 +

p2;HE
0
xH2 ,
x1R
g1
o qE,
x2R
g2
o qE:
The supremum operator in this objective makes that the upper bounds yu1E and y
u2
E
apply to any possible specication of (g1;g2) 2 Q (g). Corresponding lower bounds
are dened as yl1E = yE   yu2E and yl2E = yE   yu1E . It directly follows that a collective
rationalization of the data is possible only for individual income shares y1E and y
2
E that
meet (5).
It follows from our discussion of the preceding program P.0 that, if the solution value
of program P.0 does not exceed yE, then it is impossible to specify income shares y1E and
y2E that meet (5). If this happens then the demand function g cannot be collectively
rationalized, meaning that the collective model is rejected for the given household
demand function g. Analogous results apply to the programs that we present below.
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4.2 Identication in practice
The program P.0 described above is not yet empirically tractable, because it requires
direct consideration of all the (innitely many) elements of Q (g). In this section,
based on program P.0 we provide a program describing bounds that can be applied
in empirical practice. Our procedure begins by characterizing the bundles x1 and x2
that satisfy x1Rg
1
o qE and x2R
g2
o qE in program P.0, in terms of the observed household
demand function g.
Proposition 2 Let g be a household demand function. Then, we have x1Rg
m
o qE and
x2R
gl
o qE (m; l 2 f1; 2g, m 6= l) for all admissible individual demand functions (g1;g2)
2 Q (g) that satisfy WARP if x1 = g (p1; y1) and x2 = g (p2; y2) such that
y1  p01 (qE + x2) and y2  p02 (qE + x1) . (C)
This proposition shows that as long as condition C holds, we can conclude that
x1R
gm
o qE and x2R
gl
o qE. This result makes it possible to compute the upper bounds
yu1E and y
u2
E (and corresponding lower bounds y
l1
E = yE yu2E and yl2E = yE yu1E ) through
the following programming problem:
min
p1;p2;y1;y2
(yu1E + y
u2
E ) (P.1)
s.t.
yu1E = p
0
Ex1, y
u2
E = p
0
Ex2, (P.1-1)
y1  p01 (qE + x2) , y2  p02 (qE + x1) , (P.1-2)
x1 = g (p1; y1) , x2 = g (p2; y2) : (P.1-3)
To see how this program works, observe rst that, as in program P.0, the objective
minimizes the sum (yu1E + y
u2
E ) by suitably selecting an x1 and x2, as dened by p1,
p2, y1 and y2 using (P.1-3).The lower the value of the objective function, the tighter
are the sharing rule bounds. Next, because of Proposition 2, the constraint (P.1-2)
implies x1Rg
1
o qE and x2R
g2
o qE or x1R
g2
o qE and x2R
g1
o qE. Without loss of generality,
we assume x1Rg
1
o qE and x2R
g2
o qE. Because xmR
gm
o qE, we need
ymE <
 
pm;1E
0
x1m+
 
pm;2E
0
x2m +

pm;HE
0
xHm (7)
as can be seen by comparing this with (6) above. By construction, we have
 
pm;1E
0
x1m+ 
pm;2E
0
x2m+

pm;HE
0
xHm  p0Exm for any specication of pm;cE and xcm (c = 1; 2; H).
A feature of this program is that we avoid having to specify pm;cE and x
c
m, by instead
using just the upper bound yumE = p
0
Exm in (P.1-1). This parallels the fact that we also
do not need to consider particular specications of the individual functions gm in the
program P.1. This is what makes the program P.1 empirically tractable. We compute
the bounds yu1E , y
u2
E , y
l1
E , and y
l2
E by applying nonlinear programming techniques to
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this program. The application of these numerical methods are simplied by the fact
that both the objective and most of the constraints in program P.1 are linear. The
only nonlinear constraint is (P.1-3), since household demand functions g are generally
nonlinear.
4.3 Extensions: using more information to tighten bounds
In empirical applications, it is often reasonable to assume that a subset of goods is
privately consumed without externalities, while the nature of the other goods is un-
known. This type of information is often exploited to aid in the identication of
collective household models. Particular examples of privately consumed goods include
assignable goods and exclusive goods. An assignable good is one where information
about who consumes various quantities of the good is known to the researcher. An
example may be clothing. If information is collected about whether purchased clothing
is male or female, then that information may be used to assign these clothing expen-
ditures to the husband or wife. Closely related are exclusive goods, which are goods
that are only consumed by one household member. For example, it is often assumed
that an individuals leisure in a labor supply setting is exclusively consumed by that
individual. If assignable or exclusive goods do not entail externalities, then they ap-
pear only in the utility function of one household member, which aids in identication
(see Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori, 2009, for more discussion). This section
considers including such information on privately consumed goods to tighten sharing
rule bounds.
4.3.1 Private goods without externalities
Let NA be a subset of private goods without externalities and let NB be the subset
of other goods, so N = NA [ NB. For any good n 2 NA, we can add the following
condition to the set of collective rationalization conditions in Denition 4. Letting (a)n
denote the nth entry of vector a, for every n 2 NA, 
p1;2

n
= 0 (or
 
p1;1

n
= (p)n ) and
 
p2;1

n
= 0 (or
 
p2;2

n
= (p)n ). (8)
Intuitively, this condition says that, because there are no consumption externalities for
good n, the willingness to pay of household member m for member ls consumption of
good n is zero. Formally, condition (8) can be obtained directly from the denition of
(pm;c)n in (3).
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Using (8), we can immediately reformulate program P.1 as follows:
min
p1;p2;y1;y2
(yu1E + y
u2
E ) (P.2)
s.t.
yu1E =
X
n2NA
(pE)n
 
x11

n
+
X
n2NB
(pE)n (x1)n ; (P.2-1)
yu2E =
X
n2NA
(pE)n
 
x22

n
+
X
n2NB
(pE)n (x2)n ; (P.2-2)
y1  p01 (qE + x2) , y2  p02 (qE + x1) , (P.2-3)
(xk)n =
 
x1k

n
+
 
x2k

n
(k = 1; 2; n 2 NA) ; (P.2-4)
x1 = g (p1; y1) , x2 = g (p2; y2) :
Similar to before, the constraint (P.2-3) implies x1Rg
1
o qE and x2R
g2
o qE: Thus, we
again get the condition (7). In this case, we have
(pm;mE )n (x
m
m)n = (pE)n (x
m
m)n and

pm;lE

n
(xmm)n = 0 (m 6= l) if n 2 NA;
while 
pm;1E

n
 
x1m

n
+
 
pm;2E

n
 
x2m

n
+

pm;HE

n
 
xHm

n
 (pE)n (xm)n if n 2 NB:
Therefore, we can use 
pm;1E
0
x1m+
 
pm;2E
0
x2m +

pm;HE
0
xHm 
X
n2NA
(pE)n (x
m
m)n +
X
n2NB
(pE)n (xm)n ,
which yields (P.2-1) and (P.2-2) instead of (P.1-1) as before. Note that for n 2 NA the
privately consumed quantities (x1k)n and (x
2
k)n are not given a priori and are therefore
dened within program P.2 (subject to the constraint (P.2-4)). Like the previous
program, we can solve program P.2 by nonlinear programming techniques.
4.3.2 Assignable and exclusive goods
So far, we have used the fact that goods n 2 NA only a¤ect the utility of one household
member (i.e., exclusivity), but we have not yet exploited assignability of these goods to
individual household members. To make use of assignability, let NAm  NA represent
the set of goods that are assignable (or exclusive) to member m. Then, we get
(xmk )n = (xk)n if n 2 NAm:
Using this, we obtain the following extension of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Let g be a household demand function. Then, we have x1Rg
1
o qE and
x2R
g2
o qE for all admissible individual demand functions (g
1;g2) 2 Q (g) that satisfy
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WARP if x1 = g (p1; y1) and x2 = g (p2; y2) such that one of the following conditions
holds:
y1  p01 (qE + x2) and (C.1)X
n2NA2
(p2)n (x2)n  p02x 
X
n2NA1
(p2)n (x)n for x = x1;qE,
y2  p02 (qE + x1) and (C.2)X
n2NA1
(p1)n (x1)n  p01x 
X
n2NA2
(p1)n (x)n for x = x2;qE,
or X
n2NA1
(p1)n (x1)n  p01qE  
X
n2NA2
(p1)n (qE)n and (C.3)X
n2NA2
(p2)n (x2)n  p02qE  
X
n2NA1
(p2)n (qE)n :
The essential di¤erence between this result and Proposition 2 is that, in contrast
to condition C, the new conditions C.1, C.2 and C.3 assignpreference relations to
individual household members (i.e. we get x1Rg
1
o qE and x2R
g2
o qE), based on the
assignable goods.
Using Proposition 3, we must consider three nonlinear programs (in addition to
program P.2) to dene yu1E , y
u2
E , y
l1
E , y
l2
E . Each program has the same structure as
P.2, except that the condition C in the constraint (P.2-3) is replaced by one of the
conditions C.1-C.3. The best upper and lower bounds then correspond to minimum
and maximum values dened over the three programs.
4.4 A stylized example
We end this theoretical section with a stylized example that demonstrates the me-
chanics of program P.1. This example shows that it is possible for our method to yield
arbitrarily narrow bounds on the income shares, even when no good is a priori specied
as public or private.
For this particular example assume we have three goods so jN j = 3, and, letting (q)n
denote the quantity of the nth good in q, assume member utility functions (unknown
to the researcher) are given by
U1 = (A)  (q)1 + (B   (   1)A)  (q)2 + C  (q)3 and (9)
U2 = (B   (   1)A)  (q)1 + A  (q)2 + C  (q)3, (10)
where , A, B and C are positive real numbers specied below. Non-negative con-
sumption externalities require (B  ( 1)A) to be positive. Intuitively, one may think
of goods 1 and 2 as leisure of the rst and the second household member, while good
3 represents other household consumption.
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Next, assume the (unknown to the researcher) Pareto weight specication is
 = 0 if (p)1 > (p)2,  =1 if (p)2 > (p)1 and  = 1 if (p)1 = (p)2: (11)
In the example where goods 1 and 2 are leisure, this corresponds to a model where the
household member with the higher wage exercises complete control over the households
consumption allocation, while both members have equal bargaining weight if their
wages are equal.8
For given , assuming 0 <  < 1, specify , A, B and C such that
C < A < A+B < C
1 + 2
1 + 
and (A+B)
2 + 2
2 + 3
< A:
Then, for (B   (   1)A) positive but su¢ ciently small, it is easily veried that the
model specication in (9) and (11) generates the following results.
For
pE = (0:5 + ; 0:5 + ; 1 + ) and yE = 1
the household demand function g generated by this model is
qE = g (pE; yE) =

0; 0;
1
1 + 

;
while for
p1 =

1 + ;

2
; 1 + 

and y1 = 1 + ,
p2 =
 
2
; 1 + ; 1 + 

and y2 = 1 + ,
the household demand function is
x1 = g (p1; y1) = (1; 0; 0) and x2 = g (p2; y2) = (0; 1; 0) :
Note that
y1 = 1 + ; p
0
1x2 =

2
; p01qE = 1;
y2 = 1 + ; p
0
2x1 =

2
; p02qE = 1;
so that constraint (P.1-2) is indeed satised.
8The assumption that  = 0 if a household member does not have any control over the households
allocation is made for convenience. It can be easily shown that the argument holds for a Pareto weight
that is arbitrarily close to 0. This is of course an unrealistically extreme example, but we are only
using it to make a point about the potential informativeness of our bounds procedure.
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Applying our program P.1 to this household demand function yields bounds
yu1E = p
0
Ex1 = 0:5 + ; y
u2
E = p
0
Ex2 = 0:5 + ;
yl1E = yE   yu2E = 0:5  ; yl2E = yE   yu1E = 0:5  :
These upper and lower bounds become arbitrarily tight as  gets arbitrarily small.
This example generated household demand functions in which, for some values of
prices, only one of the three goods was demanded in nonzero quantities. This was
done only for mathematical simplicity. It would be possible, with more complicated
models, to generate examples where quantities are always nonzero while bounds are
still arbitrarily narrow.
While this example shows that it is possible in theory to obtain arbitrarily narrow
bounds without any information on the privateness or assignability of any good, in
practice, such information will typically be helpful in tightening bounds. This will be
the case for the empirical application that we present in the next section.
5 Application
5.1 Set-up
We apply our method to a model of joint labor supply and consumption decisions
of couples with and without children. Specically, at observed individual wage rates
and market prices, we consider the allocation of a households full income to both
spouses leisure and to a set of three types of nondurable consumption goods. Here
full income is dened as the sum of both spousesmaximum possible labor income
and nonlabor income (excluding savings and expenditures on durables). While we
rely on the standard assumption of separability between the modeled commodities and
durable goods, we explicitly allow for non-separability between the spousesleisure and
nondurables consumption.
This joint consumption-labor supply setting contains substantial price and wage
variation, which is useful for obtaining informative sharing rule bounds. Also, this ap-
plication allows us to consider various assumptions regarding the nature of the di¤erent
goods. For example, we examine how much the bounds tighten when we treat each
individuals leisure as an exclusive good without externalities. Lise and Seitz (2011)
similarly use labor supply to identify resource shares, but for identication their results
depend on strong functional form assumptions, as well as restrictions across households
like those in Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013).
Some implementations of collective consumption models treat wages as distribution
factors, thereby assuming that wages only a¤ect Pareto weights. These models implic-
itly assume that consumption goods are separable from leisure in utility functions, and
only deal with the consumption component of utility. In our application, we use wages
as prices (of leisure), which may therefore a¤ect both individual demand functions via
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the budget constraint, as well as appearing directly as arguments in the households
Pareto weights. As pointed out above, our methodology does not require existence of
any distribution factors, though if any are available they could be readily incorporated
into the analysis.
5.2 Data
We apply our sharing rule identication method to a sample of households drawn from
the 1999-2009 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This widely used data set
began in 1968 with a representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000
households in the United States. The data set contains information about employ-
ment, income, wealth and socio-demographic variables of these individuals and their
descendants. Moreover, since 1999 the panel also contains expenditures on a detailed
set of consumption categories (see Blundell, Pistaferri and Saporta-Eksten, 2014, for
more details on this consumption data).
In each year of data, we select households that are couples where both adult mem-
bers (aged between 25 and 65) are participating in the labor market, so both are on
an intensive margin regarding their supply of labor. The self-employed are excluded
to avoid issues regarding the imputation of wages and the separation of consumption
from work-related expenditures. In what follows, we will conduct separate analyses for
a sample of childless households and a sample of households with children. For this
last sample, we restricted the age of children to under 18 years.
Finally, we deleted households with important missing information (mostly, incom-
plete information on expenditures) and trimmed out a few households with extremely
high or low expenditures or wages. We do not exploit the panel aspect of this dataset,
because the number of periods for which we have detailed consumption data is limited
and yields a very unbalanced panel. Our resulting data set consists of a rst sample
of 865 observations on childless couples and a second sample of 1390 observations of
households with children.
We analyze the allocation of the householdsfull income to both spousesleisure and
to three categories of consumption: food (which includes food at home and food outside
the home), housing (rent or rent equivalent, home insurance and utilities) and other
goods (health, transportation, education and child care). These consumption categories
together comprise all the consumption available in the PSID. Our ve categories of
commodities provide su¢ cient relative price and wage variation to obtain signicantly
informative bounds, while avoiding modeling issues associated with zero consumption
of some goods, which can arise at more disaggregate levels of consumption.9
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics on the relevant data for the two samples
9Zeros arising from corner solutions (such as nonparticipation on the labor market or non-
consumption of some goods) do not interfere with the revealed preference characterization of the
collective model that underlies our bounds identication method. However, such zeros complicate
estimation of household demand functions of prices and income. To deal with these issues, one might
proceed along the lines of Donni (2003) or Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2007).
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at hand. Wages are net hourly wages. Leisure and annual hours worked are measured
in hours per year. To compute leisure we assume that an individual needs 8 hours per
day for non market labor requirements like sleeping (and so could work at a job for
at most 16 hours per day), and that (s)he can potentially work for 52 weeks a year.10
Leisure per year, dened as time that could potentially have been spent on market labor
but was not, therefore equals 112 available hours per week minus average hours worked
per week, all multiplied by 52 weeks. Full income and consumption expenditures are
measured in nominal dollars per year. The prices of our three nondurable goods are
region-specic consumer price indices that have been constructed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Expenditures on food 6,096 4,550 120 60,000
Expenditures on housing 18,296 13,110 2,620 99,540
Expenditures on other goods 15,048 15,389 240 140,816
Female leisure 4,109 503 2,078 5,771
Male leisure 3,611 503 327 5,537
Female annual hours worked 1,714 503 53 3,746
Male annual hours worked 2,213 503 287 5,497
Full income 235,855 117,378 75,620 716,814
Female wage 22.61 14.26 3.13 113.90
Male wage 28.43 18.82 3.43 140.77
Price food 190.38 18.79 159.87 222.27
Price housing 197.42 26.63 153.08 253.06
Price other goods 204.96 32.31 148.92 243.45
Age female 48.7 8.1 25 64
Age male 50.2 8.0 25 65
Grade education female 13.9 2.0 6 17
Grade education male 13.7 2.2 6 17
Home owner 0.94 0.25 0 1
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - childless couples
5.3 Demand estimation
A crucial ingredient to our identication method is g (p; y), the households vector-
valued demand function with respect to both spouses leisure and the three non-
durables. We consider four di¤erent estimators for this household level demand system:
10Subtracting time needed to sleep from total time available is common in this type of studies
without an explicit model of home production. See, for example, Hoynes (1996), Keane and Mo¢ tt
(1998) and Lise and Seitz (2011).
20
Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Expenditures on food 7,398 4,374 120 55,800
Expenditures on housing 18,776 13,552 1,800 114,692
Expenditures on other goods 15,243 13,522 550 142,540
Female leisure 4,260 577 1,765 5,804
Male leisure 3,623 457 0 5,726
Female annual hours worked 1,563 577 20 4,059
Male annual hours worked 2,201 457 98 5,824
Full income 235,367 121,303 70,731 840,296
Female wage 20.82 13,97 3,05 134,53
Male wage 29.16 19,65 3,08 193,56
Price food 187.41 18.42 159.87 222.27
Price housing 193.74 26.20 153.08 253.06
Price other goods 199.66 32.46 148.92 243.45
Age female 41.2 6.3 25 61
Age male 42.9 6.7 25 65
Grade education female 14.3 2.0 3 17
Grade education male 14.0 2.2 3 17
Homeowner 0.92 0.27 0 1
Number of children 1.8 0.8 1 8
Table 2: Descriptive statistics - couples with children
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(i) a fully nonparametric demand system, (ii) a exible parametric demand system, (iii)
a parametric system imposing (di¤erential based) parameter restrictions that are im-
plied by the collective consumption model and (iv) the same parametric system in
which we add taste shifters to capture heterogeneity across our households.
The function g is a ve element vector, but only four elements need to be estimated
because the fth element is determined given the others by the budget constraint
p0g =y, where p is the vector of individual wages and prices and y is full income. This
is known in the consumer demand literature as the adding upconstraint. For our
nonparametric demand system, we estimate the rst four elements of g (i.e. spouses
leisure and consumption of food and housing) as the tted values of nonparametrically
regressing the households quantities of these goods on both membersdeated wages,
on the deated prices of food and housing, and on the deated households full income.
Each of these regressors was obtained by dividing nominal wages, prices and full income
by the price of the third nondurable (other goods). This deation by the price of
the remaining good in the system imposes the homogeneity of demand implied by the
absence of money illusion. The nonparametric regressions we use are Nadaraya-Watson
kernel estimators with a Gaussian product kernel.
The three parametric demand systems we estimate are versions of Banks, Blundell
and Lewbels (1997) Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS). Thanks to
its exibility, QUAIDS is one of the most widely used demand systems in empirical
analyses that are based on the unitary model. However, as demonstrated by Browning
and Chiappori (1998), it can also be used to analyze collective household behavior. In
particular, these authors derived restrictions that the QUAIDS parameters must satisfy
if household demand is to be consistent with the collective model. In our application,
we estimated QUAIDS both with and without these restrictions. This will also allow
us to assess whether the parameter estimates of the QUAIDS demand system are
consistent with the theoretical implications of the collective model.
Specically, the second demand system in our analysis is QUAIDS without any
restrictions imposed other than the same adding-up and homogeneity constraints that
are also imposed in the nonparametric demand system. Under QUAIDS, the budget
share of commodity i (i = 1; :::; 5) takes the parametric form
wi = i + i ln

y
a (p)

+
i
b (p)

ln

y
a (p)
2
+
5X
j=1
ij ln pj; (12)
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where pj is the jth element of p and where
ln a (p) = 0 +
5X
i=1
i ln pi +
1
2
5X
i=1
5X
j=1
ij ln pi ln pj;
b (p) =
5Y
i=1
p
i
i ;
 (p) =
5X
i=1
i ln pi:
The parameters i, i, i and ij (8i; j) are to be estimated. We follow Banks, Blundell
and Lewbel (1997) by setting the parameter 0 to a value just below the lowest value
of ln y in the data. The adding-up constraint implies that
P
i i = 1,
P
i i = 0,P
i i = 0 and
P
i ij = 0 (8j), while homogeneity requires
P
j ij = 0 (8i). Adding-
up is then satised by construction. We impose homogeneity by estimating the system
in terms of deated prices and deated full income (in line with the nonparametric
system discussed above). Assuming additive errors, the system is estimated by means
of Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS). The tted value of the quantity consumed of a
particular good is obtained by multiplying its tted value of the budget share by full
income divided by the goods own price.
Our third demand system estimator exploits the (di¤erential) behavioral impli-
cations of the collective model by imposing restrictions on the above QUAIDS. As
discussed in the Introduction, Browning and Chiappori (1998) showed that a neces-
sary condition for the household demand function g to be consistent with the collective
model with two decision makers is that it satises SR1, i.e. that the associated pseudo-
Slutsky matrix, dened as S =@g(p;y)
@p0 +
@g(p;y)
@y
g (p; y)0, can be decomposed into the sum
of a symmetric negative semi-denite matrix and a matrix of rank 1. They also show
that in the QUAIDS model, this SR1 condition holds if and only if the same decompo-
sition applies to the matrix   = (ij), which equivalently requires that the rank of the
(real) antisymmetric matrix M =      0 is at most 2. Let mij denote an element of
M: Lemma 3 of Browning and Chiappori shows that this rank condition holds if and
only if, for all i; k such that k > i > 2,
mik =
m1im2k  m1km2i
m12
(13)
where, without loss of generality, m12 is assumed to be di¤erent from zero. To obtain
our SR1-restricted QUAIDS parameters, we estimated the above described budget
share equations (12) by means of NLS while imposing the equality restrictions in (13).
Finally, for our fourth demand system, we still impose these SR1 restrictions, but
we also add a couple of taste shifters to account for observable heterogeneity across
households. Our taste shifters are the age of the husband and a dummy for home
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ownership (denoted by t1 and t2, respectively).11 We only add these two taste shifters
and not more because they appear to be particularly important, and the dimensionality
of our model is already relatively high given our sample sizes. The new budget share
equations are obtained by replacing the above constant i by
i = i;0 + i;1t1 + i;2t2:
This is the same way Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) add taste shifters. As before,
we estimate these budget share equations using NLS while imposing the SR1 equality
restrictions in (13).
When constructing bounds based on all of these estimated demand systems, we
imposed the restriction that male and female leisure are each private, assignable, and
do not generate externalities. We did not place any restriction on the nature of our
three nondurable goods, which allows the consumption of each of these goods to be
public, private (with or without externalities), or both.12 We coded both the demand
estimation step and the bounds calculations in MATLAB, using TOMLAB/SNOPT to
solve our nonlinear programs. In the supplemental materials to the paper, we provide
more details on our estimates of the di¤erent demand systems, together with our codes.
5.4 Empirical results
We assume a collective model with two decision makers. This is not a constraint for
our rst sample, which consists of childless couples. But for the second sample, this
means that we model the expenditures on children as consumption goods that provide
utility to both parents, as in Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) and Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2012a). This is a common assumption in the empirical
collective household model literature. An alternative approach would have been to
treat children as additional consumers with their own utility functions and Pareto
weights in the collective model, as in Bargain and Donni (2012) or Dunbar, Lewbel,
and Pendakur (2013).13 In principle, our identication method described in Section
4 can be generalized towards collective models with more than two decision makers.
But, to ease both exposition and computational requirements, we do not consider this
extension in our current application.
11Including the ages of both spouses resulted in a multicollinearity problem, because of the strong
correlation between these two variables.
12Without an assignable good, one cannot infer the identity (i.e., male or female) corresponding to
a particular income share. By using leisure as an assignable good for each spouse, we can separately
identify (bounds on) male and female income shares, which is useful for our analyses in Sections 5.4.2
and 5.4.3. Still, we also experimented with estimates that allowed all goods to be public, private, or
both, and allowed all to have externalities, but we found that this most general possible specication
often failed to provide useful bounds, likely due to the limited size of the available data set.
13Our empirical application included leisure, with prices given by wages, but our general method
does not require this. Since the price of leisure (wages) is not observed for children, utility for children
would need to be based only on their consumption of goods, and so we would not be able to measure
the impact of childrens leisure on their utility or on resource shares.
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5.4.1 Comparisons of sharing rule bounds
We assumed leisure is private and assignable, so the value of a household members
leisure is a lower bound on that members share of full income. This naive lower
bound assigns all of the households nondurable consumption to the other household
member. Similarly, a naive upper bound gives a household member his/her leisure and
all of the households nondurable consumption. These naive bounds do not make use
of any revealed preference restrictions associated with the collective household model.
We now have ve di¤erent estimates of sharing rule bounds: naive bounds, and
bounds based on each of the four demand system estimators described in the previous
section. We can evaluate the usefulness of our method, and the informativeness of the
assumptions underlying each of the demand system estimates, by comparing the bounds
obtained using each estimator to the naive bounds. In this section only, we carry out
this comparison using just our sample of childless couples. This provides a cleaner
assessment of the empirical usefulness of our method than the analysis of couples
with children, because, as described earlier, the latter impose additional modeling
assumptions regarding the number of decision makers in the household. However, the
next section will then show that our method yields usefully informative bounds for
couples with children as well.
Since resource shares sum to one, we only need to report bounds for one of the
two decision makers. We therefore report just the female resource share bounds. The
results for childless couples are summarized in Table 3, where the columns labeled
Naive, RP1, RP2, RP3 and RP4 refer respectively to naive bounds based only on the
privateness of leisure, and bounds obtained through the nonparametric demand system,
QUAIDS without SR1 imposed, QUAIDS with SR1 imposed, and QUAIDS with taste
shifters and SR1 imposed. Each entry of this table gives the di¤erence between the
upper and lower bound on y1= (y1 + y2) where member 1 is the female, i.e., bounds
on the female relative income share. The bounds are reported as percentages of total
income, so the largest possible di¤erence between the lower and the upper bound that
could be reported in the table is 100, and at the other extreme point identication of an
income share would imply an entry of zero in the table. We calculate these estimated
di¤erences between upper and lower bounds separately for every couple in the sample,
and Table 3 then gives summary statistics of the distribution (across all the couples in
the sample) of these di¤erences.
Comparing the naive and RP1 columns of Table 3 shows that our RP based method
provides a substantial improvement over the naive bounds, even with fully nonpara-
metric demand function estimates. The average di¤erence between the upper and lower
naive bounds is about 17.5 percentage points, which narrows to 9.5 percentage points
using the nonparametric RP1 estimates.14
The RP1 and RP2 bounds are fairly similar, which indicates that our parametric
QUAIDS model yields results similar to the nonparametric demand system. This shows
14Also, the smallest bounds for all four of our demand systems are zero to two decimal places,
showing that for some households we come very close to point identication.
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that the parametric QUAIDS functional form does not impose undue restrictions on the
data, since it yields roughly the same results as the nonparametric alternative. This
is a useful observation since, as discussed above, this parametric specication easily
allows for imposing Browning and Chiapporis (1998) SR1 condition, and for adding
taste shifters.
Next, our results for the RP3 bounds are also similar to those for the RP1 and RP2
bounds. This shows that there is little gain in going from either RP1 or RP2 to RP3.
The di¤erence between RP2 and RP3 is only the imposition of the SR1 condition.
Since this condition is supposed to hold anyway given the assumption of a Pareto
e¢ cient collective household, it is reassuring that our estimated demand equations and
associated bounds estimates are little changed when SR1 is imposed. This is further
conrmed by the nonlinear analog to the F -test of the parameter restrictions in going
from RP2 to RP3, which does not reject the null hypothesis of the SR1 restrictions.15
Note that the classic Chiappori non-identication theorem is that the SR1 restrictions
(i.e., the di¤erential restrictions implied by the collective household model) do not
su¢ ce to point identify the sharing rule.
The bounds in the last column, where taste shifters are included, are quite a bit
tighter than those in the other columns. Exploiting observable heterogeneity across
households in the demand estimation step appears to yield considerably more informa-
tive bounds. The average di¤erence between lower and upper bounds in this column
is below 3 percentage points. Moreover, the third quantile row of Table 3 shows that,
with RP4, for more than 75% of the couples the di¤erence between the upper and lower
bounds is less than 4.5 percentage points. This shows that we can make quite precise
predictions about each spouses resource share for a substantial majority of households.
Naive RP1 RP2 RP3 RP4
Mean 17.52 9.52 8.93 9.04 2.91
Minimum 3.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
First quartile 12.12 5.80 3.18 3.27 0.72
Median 15.78 9.71 8.11 8.57 2.21
Third quartile 21.68 12.78 13.40 13.51 4.48
Maximum 64.03 52.54 42.41 39.95 41.66
Table 3: Percentage point di¤erences between upper and lower bounds on the female
income share - childless couples
As a further exercise, we consider the statistical precision of our sharing rule upper
and lower bound estimates, by means of a bootstrap procedure.16 For compactness, we
restrict attention to the apparently most useful bounds, which are those based on RP4.
15Similarly, we can conclude that the SR1 restriction cannot be rejected for the QUAIDS model
with taste shifters, and for QUAIDS with and without taste shifters for the sample of couples with
children. In all cases, p-values are well above any reasonable signicance level.
16We do not attempt to derive formal limiting distribution theory for our estimates of bounds. While
some asymptotic results exist for inference on set identied objects, our estimators are considerably
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We construct 100 data sets by drawing randomly (with replacement) 865 households
from our original data set of 865 childless couples. For each of these new datasets, we
estimated QUAIDS with two taste shifters included and SR1 imposed. We then used
the resulting parameter estimates to obtain RP4 sharing rule bounds. To summarize
the results, we estimate bounds for nine combinations of the spouseswages: female
wage equal to the rst, second or third quartile of the female wage distribution com-
bined with male wage equal to the rst, second or third quartile of the male wage
distribution (with full income each time adjusted accordingly).
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations across the bootstrap replications
of the lower bounds (LB) and the upper bounds (UB) for each of these nine scenar-
ios. All the bounds appear to be rather precisely estimated, with bootstrap standard
deviations between 3.7 and 5.1 percent. If we assume normality, we can reject the
assumption that spouses with very unequal wages share income equally, but we cannot
reject equal sharing for spouses with similar wages. Finally, Table 4 provides evidence
that spousesshares of income increase when their relative wages increases. We will
return to this relationship between relative wages and individual income shares in the
next section.
Female wage/Male wage Mean LB Std.dev. LB Mean UB Std.dev. UB
Quartile 1/Quartile 1 47.39% 4.16% 50.42% 4.10%
Quartile 2/Quartile 1 51.23% 3.81% 54.58% 4.11%
Quartile 3/Quartile 1 57.84% 3.73% 62.39% 4.44%
Quartile 1/Quartile 2 41.92% 4.06% 45.43% 4.20%
Quartile 2/Quartile 2 46.22% 4.10% 50.53% 4.51%
Quartile 3/Quartile 2 51.76% 3.81% 55.86% 4.33%
Quartile 1/Quartile 3 32.99% 4.51% 39.14% 4.45%
Quartile 2/Quartile 3 39.49% 5.07% 44.72% 4.63%
Quartile 3/Quartile 3 44.63% 4.61% 48.62% 4.43%
Table 4: Bootstrap summary statistics on the female income share - childless couples
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 reveal that we obtain quite narrow and hence
informative sharing rule bounds. In what follows, we investigate the implications of
these bounds in more detail. To focus our discussion, from here on out we restrict
attention to results based on RP4 bounds. However, we found that the other three
demand systems yielded qualitatively similar results. Our remaining analyses will
consider both couples with and without children, obtaining informative results for
both types of households.
more elaborate than those to which existing theory can be readily applied. These bootstrap results
should therefore only be interpreted informally.
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5.4.2 The relation between sharing rule bounds, total income, and relative
wages
We next focus on the relationships between our estimated bounds and various individ-
ual and household characteristics, for both childless couples and couples with children.
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between the RP based bounds on the female
income share in dollars, y1, and the logarithm of the households full income, ln (y).
Each  and + sign on the gures represents the upper and lower bound for a given
household in our sample. To help visualize the results, we include trendlines show-
ing local sample averages (i.e., nonparametric regressions) of the estimated upper and
lower bounds.
Figure 1 shows that the bounds are mostly very narrow for childless couples, re-
ecting the results in Table 3. The trendlines are upward sloping as one would expect,
showing that total resources consumed by the female increase as total household income
increases, making her consumption a normal good (as opposed to an inferior good) in
the household.
Figure 2 reveals roughly the same pattern for couples with children. For these
households, we obtain bounds that, while still informatively narrow, are generally
wider than for childless couples. One possible explanation is that even young children
may have some bargaining power. If children are to some extent separate decision
makers in the household, with their own bargaining weights and resource shares (as in
Bargain and Donni, 2012, and Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur, 2013), then this makes
part of total household income not directly allocatable to either the mother or the
father, which could lead to wider bound estimates for their individual income shares.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the relative female income share, y1=y, against ln (y). In both
cases, the trendlines are slightly decreasing, but quite close to horizontal. This nding
lends empirical support to the assumption that relative income shares do not vary with
total income, which Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and Bargain and Donni (2012) used
to help point identify resource shares. These results lend even stronger support for the
weaker assumption used by Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2013) to help obtain point
identication, which is that relative income shares do not vary with total income at
low income levels.17
The trendlines in Figures 3 and 4 give average upper bounds around 50% and
average lower bounds around 40% to 45%. These results suggest that the income shares
of females and males are not far from equal on average, though with men having slightly
larger shares on average. This is conrmed by the average lower and upper bound for
all the households in our sample. For childless couples, these averages are 44.04% and
46.87%, whereas for couples with children they equal 42.44% and 51.14%. However,
the gures also show that some households divide their full income very unequally,
17Note, however, that these authors dene publicness of goods di¤erently than we do, and their
empirical applications focus on a di¤erent denition of full income, since they do not include leisure
in their consumption models. See also Menon, Pendakur, and Perali (2012), who provide additional
empirical evidence supporting this assumption.
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Figure 1: Absolute sharing rule bounds (Y-axis) and the logarithm of full income
(X-axis) - childless couples
Figure 2: Absolute sharing rule bounds (Y-axis) and the logarithm of full income
(X-axis) - couples with children
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Figure 3: Relative sharing rule bounds (Y-axis) and the logarithm of full income (X-
axis) - childless couples
e.g., there exist a number of households that have upper and lower bounds of the
relative female income share less than 15%, and there exist other households where
these bounds are both above 80%. Since leisure is assumed to be private, and is priced
at an individuals own wage level, most of these extreme households are ones where the
spouses have very unequal wage levels. In such households a sizeable fraction of total
household nondurable consumption would need to be given to the low wage spouse to
roughly equalize income shares.
We next look at the relationship between the bounds on relative female income
shares and relative wages (dened as female wages divided by male wages). Figures
5 and 6 show the household specic upper and lower bounds and the corresponding
trendlines. As expected, the bounds on womens resource shares tend to increase
when their relative wage goes up. This result, which we obtained through our RP
based approach, conrms earlier evidence found in the literature, which shows that a
household members bargaining power is generally higher when her/his relative wage
is higher (see Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002, Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and
Meghir, 2007, and Ore¢ ce, 2011, among many others). However, as noted above, this
result may also be in part an artifact of including leisure in total income and assuming
leisure is private.
5.4.3 Poverty analysis
A unique advantage of models that focus on the intrahousehold allocation of resources
is that they allow one to conduct welfare analyses directly at the level of individuals
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Figure 4: Relative sharing rule bounds (Y-axis) and the logarithm of full income (X-
axis) - couples with children
Figure 5: Relative sharing rule bounds (Y-axis) and the relative wage (wage fe-
male/wage male) (X-axis) - childless couples
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Figure 6: Relative sharing rule bounds (Y-axis) and the relative wage (wage fe-
male/wage male) (X-axis) - couples with children
rather than at the level of households. See Chiappori (1992), Blundell, Chiappori
and Meghir (2005) and Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) for further discussion,
and Lise and Seitz (2011), Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012b), and Dunbar,
Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) for examples of such analyses.
Here we use our RP based bounds to conduct a poverty analysis at the level of
individuals. Unlike previous studies that are based on point identied sharing rules,
for our analysis we do not impose any assumptions regarding similarity of preferences
across individuals, or impose functional forms at the level of individuals demand func-
tions, or impose functional restrictions on the sharing rule.18 We also do not require
or assume the availability of distribution factors.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of our poverty analysis for the two types
of couples under study. The rst column in both tables contains the poverty rate
calculated in the usual way, i.e., the poverty rate is dened as the percentage of house-
holds (without and with children, respectively) having full income that falls below the
poverty line, which we x at 60% of the median full income in the relevant sample
of households. Note that while 60% of the median income is a standard measure of
relative poverty (e.g. used in the denition of OECD poverty rates), in our case the
poverty rate is calculated on the basis of full income instead of (the more commonly
used) earnings or total expenditures. Also, our data consists of couples where both
18For example, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) and Lise and Seitz (2011) assume similarity
of preferences of (fe)male singles and preferences of (fe)male individuals in couples, while Dunbar,
Lewbel and Pendakur (2013) assume restrictions upon individual preferences.
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spouses participate in the labor market, and so our poverty line will be higher than a
line based on data that includes households with unemployed or retired members. Our
poverty line also does not make use of data on singles living alone or with children.
The second column in Tables 5 and 6 shows the incidence of poverty at the level of
individuals in the sample, based on our RP income share estimates. For this and the
remaining columns in the tables, an individual is labeled as poor if her/his income share
falls below the individual poverty line (dened as half of the poverty line for couples
used in column 1). Using our estimated income share bounds, we compute upper and
lower bounds for individual poverty rates. If all couples split income perfectly equally,
then these poverty rates would equal those in column 1. However, despite our earlier
nding that many couples have close to equal divisions of income, we nd that the
individual poverty rate is above the household poverty rate. For childless couples, the
lower and upper rates of individual poverty equal 15.32% and 18.55%, compared to
the household rate of 11.33%. As indicated above, sharing rule bounds are somewhat
wider for couples with children. Nonetheless, here too we nd a similar pattern: the
household poverty rate is 12.22%, whereas the lower and upper rates of individual
poverty equal 12.65% and 24.84%.
Our results imply that, due to unequal sharing of resources within households, the
fraction of individuals living below the poverty line may be considerably greater than
the fraction obtained by standard measures that ignore intrahousehold allocations.
Thus, the incidence of poverty at the individual level may be substantially higher than
is indicated by standard measures based on household level income.
The remaining columns of Tables 5 and 6 provide separate bounds on poverty rates
for females and males. For childless couples, we nd that the upper bound on the
poverty rate for males is much lower than the lower bound for females. Next, for
couples with children, we nd that the respective lower and upper bounds on poverty
rates for females are substantially above those for males. Overall, these results suggest
that, among couples, poverty is primarily a female phenomenon in our data.
Households All individuals Females Males
Household poverty rate 11.33% - - -
Lower bound - 15.32% 20.69% 12.32%
Upper bound - 18.55% 24.74% 12.37%
Table 5: Poverty rates - childless couples
Households All individuals Females Males
Household poverty rate 12.22% - - -
Lower bound - 12.65% 15.03% 10.28%
Upper bound - 24.84% 29.48% 20.20%
Table 6: Poverty rates - couples with children
33
6 Conclusions
It has long been known that, under the general collective household model, the income
sharing rule is not point identied. Past responses to this result have been to focus
on features of the model that are identied (like the impacts of distribution factors),
or to add strong additional assumptions on preferences or behavior to obtain point
identication. In contrast, we show that, given just household level demand functions,
bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained by imposing inequality restrictions that are
implied by revealed preference theory as applied to the (unobserved) demand functions
of individual household members. We show that informative bounds are possible even
when nothing is known about the privateness or assignability of any of the goods being
consumed by household members, and when no distribution factors are observed. We
show how these bounds can be implemented using standard programming methods, em-
ploying household level demand functions that are estimated by standard parametric
or nonparametric regression methods. We also show how bounds can be tightened by
using additional information that may be available on the privateness and assignabil-
ity of some goods, by the use of household level demand functions that satisfy the
SR1 di¤erential restriction implied by the collective household model, and by adding
information on taste shifters.
At the practical level, we demonstrate that our identication methods are empiri-
cally tractable and yield usefully narrow bounds when applied to American households
drawn from the PSID. We show the usefulness of these bounds by providing empirical
analyses of the e¤ects of household characteristics like income and relative wages on
income shares, and we provide a distributional analysis of the incidence of poverty at
the level of individuals rather than at the level of observed households.
In our analysis, the household demand functions are estimated, and we have only to
a limited extent taken into account estimation errors. Some results exist on inference
for set identied objects, including Manski (2003), Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer
(2007), Beresteanu and Molinari (2008), and Galichon and Henry (2009). In particular,
the studies of Hoderlein and Stoye (2013), Kitamura and Stoye (2013) and Henry and
Mourié (2013), which focus on set identication in a revealed preference context,
provide machinery that might be usable for developing inference for our analyses, which
are quite a bit more complicated than existing applications to which such asymptotic
theory has been successfully applied. Similar issues arise in other applications that
combine demand estimation with revealed preference restrictions, such as Blundell,
Browning and Crawford (2008) and Blundell, Kristensen and Matzkin (2014).
To avoid further complications, our analysis was based on a collective model with
two decision makers. However, our methods immediately extend in theory to handle
more than two consumers per household. Therefore, they could be used to estimate
bounds on childrens resource shares as well, treating children as additional consumers
with their own utility functions and Pareto weights in the collective model, as in Bar-
gain and Donni (2012) or Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013), but without the
restrictions on preferences that these authors require. The main modication needed
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to deal with children is that their leisure could not be included in the model, because
wages for children are not observed.
We obtain our bounds without observing any distribution factors. An advantage
of not requiring distribution factors is that such variables are assumed to only a¤ect
allocations but not tastes, and this can be di¢ cult to verify. For example, wages (while
appearing in our model) are not distribution factors in our model, because in addition
to possibly a¤ecting allocations, wages also a¤ect the consumption of leisure. Wages
can only be distribution factors in models that assume separability of leisure from
consumption. Still, if one observed distribution factors, then they could be incorporated
into our analysis by conditioning the bounds calculations on the values of these factors.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
This result follows from adapting the original reasoning of Samuelson (1938) to our
collective setting. Specically, Denition 4 states that a pair of utility functions U1
and U2 provides a collective rationalization of g if there exist admissible individual
demand functions (g1;g2) 2 Q (g) such that, for each m,
gm
 
pm;1;pm;2;pm;H ; ym

= q1 + q2 + qH
for
(q1;q2;qH) = arg max
x1;x2;xH
[Um
 
x1;x2;xH

s.t. 
pm;1
0
x1 +
 
pm;2
0
x2 +
 
pm;H
0
xH  ym].
Thus, for each individual m there must exist a utility function Um such that the
function gm solves the corresponding maximization problem for any prices pm;1; pm;2;
pm;H and income ym. Samuelsons (1938) argument obtains that this is possible only
if the function gm satises the WARP condition in Denition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
As a rst step, we prove (for all (g1;g2) 2 Q (g))
(y1  p01x2 and y2  p02x1))
 
x1R
gm
o x2 and x2R
gl
o x1 (l 6= m)

: (14)
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To obtain this result, we note that y1  p01x2 implies by constructionX2
m=1
 
pm;11
0
x11 +
 
pm;21
0
x21 +

pm;H1
0
xH1 (15)

X2
m=1
 
pm;11
0
x12 +
 
pm;21
0
x22 +

pm;H1
0
xH2
for all possible specications of pm;c1 , x
c
1 and x
c
2 (m = 1; 2; c = 1; 2; 3). The inequality
(15) necessarily obtains 
pm;11
0
x11 +
 
pm;21
0
x21 +

pm;H1
0
xH1 
 
pm;11
0
x12 +
 
pm;21
0
x22 +

pm;H1
0
xH2
for m = 1 or 2, which can also be expressed as x1Rg
1
o x2 or x1R
g2
o x2 for all (g
1;g2)
2 Q (g).
Now, without loss of generality, let us assume x1Rg
1
o x2 (i.e. m = 1 in (14)). Then,
because the functions (g1;g2) satisfy WARP, we must have 
p1;12
0
x11 +
 
p1;22
0
x21 +

p1;H2
0
xH1 >
 
p1;12
0
x12 +
 
p1;22
0
x22 +

p1;H2
0
xH2 : (16)
In turn, because y2  p02x1, this implies 
p2;12
0
x11 +
 
p2;22
0
x21 +

p2;H2
0
xH1 
 
p2;12
0
x12 +
 
p2;22
0
x22 +

p2;H2
0
xH2 ;
or x2Rg
2
o x1. This proves (14).
As a second step, we show (for all (g1;g2) 2 Q (g)) 
x1R
gm
o x2 and y2  p02 (qE + x1)
) x2Rglo qE (l 6= m) : (17)
To prove this result, we rst observe that y2  p02 (qE + x1) impliesX2
m=1
 
pm;12
0
x12 +
 
pm;22
0
x22 +

pm;H2
0
xH2 (18)

X2
m=1
 
pm;12
0  
q1E + x
1
1

+
 
pm;22
0  
q2E + x
2
1

+

pm;H2
0  
qHE + x
H
1

;
for all possible specications of pm;c1 , x
c
1, x
c
2 and q
c
E (m = 1; 2; c = 1; 2; H).
Without loss of generality, let us now assume x1Rg
1
o x2 (i.e. m = 1 in (17)). Like
before, WARP consistency then requires (16), and combining this last inequality with
(18) yields 
p2;12
0
x12 +
 
p2;22
0
x22 +

p2;H2
0
xH2 >
 
p2;12
0
q1E +
 
p2;22
0
q2E +

p2;H2
0
qHE ;
or x2Rg
2
o qE. This proves (17).
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Now, a directly similar reasoning as the one leading up to (17) yields
x2R
gl
o x1 and y1  p01 (qE + x2)

)  x1Rgmo qE (m 6= l) : (19)
Combining (14), (17) and (19) gives the wanted result: we have x1Rg
m
o qE and
x2R
gl
o qE for all admissible individual demand functions (g
1;g2) 2 Q (g) that satisfy
WARP if y1  p01 (qE + x2) and y2  p02 (qE + x1).
Proof of Proposition 3
In what follows, we only give the proof for condition C.1. The arguments for the
remaining conditions C.2 and C.3 are analogous.
As a rst step, we prove that (for x = x1;qE and for all (g1;g2) 2 Q (g))X
n2NA2
(p2)n (x2)n  p02x 
X
n2NA1
(p2)n (x)n (20)
)

x2R
g2
o x1 and x2R
g2
o qE

To obtain this result, we note that 
p2;12
0
x12+
 
p2;22
0
x22 +

p2;H2
0
xH2 
X
n2NA2
(p2)n (x2)n (21)
for any possible specication of p2;c2 and x
c
2 (c = 1; 2; H). Indeed, (x
2
k)n = (xk)n and 
p2;22

n
= (p2)n for the assignable goods n 2 NA2, which yields 
p2;22
0
x22 
X
n2NA2
(p2)n (x2)n ,
while
 
p2;12
0
x12 +

p2;H2
0
xH2  0 by construction.
Similarly, we have (for x = x1;qE)
p02x 
X
n2NA1
(p2)n (x)n 
 
p2;12
0
x1+
 
p2;22
0
x2 +

p2;H2
0
xH : (22)
To see this, we can use an analogous argument as before to get 
p1;12
0
x1+
 
p1;22
0
x2 +

p1;H2
0
xH 
X
n2NA1
(p2)n (x1)n ;
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and thus
p02x 
X
n2NA1
(p2)n (x)n
 p2x 
 
p1;12
0
x1+
 
p1;22
0
x2 +

p1;H2
0
xH

=
 
p2;12
0
x1+
 
p2;22
0
x2 +

p2;H2
0
xH :
Combining (21) and (22) gives (for x = x1;qE) 
p2;12
0
x12+
 
p2;22
0
x22 +

p2;H2
0
xH2 
 
p2;12
0
x1+
 
p2;22
0
x2 +

p2;H2
0
xH ;
which yields x2Rg
2
o x1 and x2R
g2
o qE for all (g
1;g2) 2 Q (g) : This proves (20).
From this rst step we conclude x2Rg
2
o x1 under condition C.1. Next,we can use a
similar argument as in Proposition 2 (for (17)) to obtain (for all (g1;g2) 2 Q (g))
x2R
g2
o x1 and y1  p01 (qE + x2)

)

x1R
g1
o qE

: (23)
This gives the wanted result: we have x1Rg
1
o qE and x2R
g2
o qE for all admissible
individual demand functions (g1;g2) 2 Q (g) that satisfy WARP if condition C.1 holds.
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